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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL
COMPANY and ARGONAUT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, and
JERRY ALLEN TAYLOR,
Defendants.

Case No.
13872

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Utah Industrial Commission which decreed that apportionment
of liability among successive workmen's compensation
insurance carriers was not allowed in Utah in the absence of a statute specifically providing for apportionment.
DISPOSITION IN THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Commission ruled that plaintiffs Argonaut
Insurance Company and Mountain States Steel were
liable to the applicant-employee, Jerry Taylor, for compensation under the Utah Workmen's Compensaltion Act
1
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for his 15% permanent partial disability as well as his
medical expenses and temporary total disability subsequent to the third of a series of three injuries to his back;

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek to have the order of the Industrial Commission reversed and have this court rule that
apportionment of liability among successive Workmen
Compensation insurance carriers is proper under the
facts of this case.
FACTS
The applicant, Jerry Allen Taylor, sought compensation from the Utah State Industrial Commission for
three back injuries which he alleged culminated in his
permanent partial disability. In 1969, while working in
Klakamus, Oregon, in the course of his employment with
Linwood Lumber Company, the applicant injured his
back while lifting. He was off work for three weeks as
a result of this injury and was compensated for temporary disability under the Oregon Workmen's Compensation laws.
He eventually moved to Utah and began working
for Mountain States Steel on May 22, 1969, where he
continued to be bothered by pain in his left leg as a result of the Oregon injury. While working at Mountain
States Steel he again injured his back while pushing a
welding unit in January of 1973. The industrial accident insurance carrier for Mountain States Steel at that
time was the defendant Liberty Mutual.
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The applicant continued work without losing any
time due to the second injury until October 5,1973, when
he tripped and twisted his ankle while walking through
the shop where he worked. His back was again injured
as a result of his tripping. Following this injury, he
underwent surgery for the repair of two herniated intervertebral discs. The insurance carrier for the employer, (Mountain States Steel) at the time of this third
injury was the plaintiff Argonaut. A hearing was held
on March 7, 1974 before Richard G. Sumsion, hearing
examiner for the Utah State Industrial Commission on
the questions of the applicant's disability and the liability
of the respective compensation insurance carriers.
Following the hearing, the applicant was referred
to a special medical panel for an examination as to
applicant's disability and the relationship of the applicant's back condition to the various industrial accidents
that he had sustained.
No objections were filed to the medical panel findings by any of the parties and the hearing examiner
adopted the findings of the medical panel. The findings
of the medical panel were that the applicant had suffered a herniated but not extruded intervertebral disc
as a result of the Oregon injury; that the injury of
January 27, 1973 was a significant aggravating factor
which contributed toward the eventual need for surgery;
and that the third injury of October 3, 1973 was also a
precipitating factor making surgery necessary at that
time. The applicant was found to have a permanent 15%
loss of body function, with 5% of that disability resulting

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from each of the three accidents. (Pages 118 - 121 on
the Record of Appeal).- ••'
- The Examiner held that the applicant was entitled
to benefits for the disability which resulted from the
cumulative effect of the three injuries, and held each of
the Utah carriers should pay one-third toward the applicant's permanent partial disability.
A motion for review was then filed by Liberty Mutual with a supporting memorandum, which was opposed
by Argonaut Insurance Company. The matter was reviewed by the Industrial Commission which reversed
the Order of the Examiner, holding that:
The State of Utah does not have an apportionment statute and in the absence of the same
we are of the opinion that the responsibility
should be assigned to the last carrier. (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2; Record
on Appeal, p. 142)
The Commission continued:
It would appear to this Commission that there
is some merit to the apportionment method applied by the New York Court but again we refer
back to the Storer case [Duaine Brown Chevrolet
Co. and Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Commission and Storer, 511 P.2d 743, 29 U.2d
478 (1973)] where our court indicated we have
no authority under present statute to make such
an apportionment. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 3; Record on Appeal, p.
143).
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The Commission then ordered Argonaut to pay compensation for all of the permanent 15% disability and
the medical expenses and temporary disability incurred
subsequent to October 3, 1973. It is from this order that
the plaintiffs bring this action, seeking reversal of 'the
Commission's order.
ARGUMENT ,._..;,,,:-..,POINT I
THE UTAH CASE AUTHORITY UPON
WHICH THE COMMISSION BASED ITS
ORDER IS NOT CONTROLLING UNDER
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.
The Commission based its reversal of the Hearing
Examiner's Order "primarily on the case of Duaine
Brown Chevrolet Co. and Royal Globe Insurance Co.,
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah and Arlen K. Storer,
511 P.2d 743, 29 U.2d 478." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2; Record on Appeal, p. 142). The
Commission quoted the following language from the
Duaine Brown case to support its holding that in the
absence of an apportionment statute the full responsibility for the disability should be assigned to the last
carrier:
Some states have apportionment statutes
which allow a recovery to be prorated among
multiple insurers. We have no such statute in
the State of Utah, nor has the court attempted
by decision to make apportionments. The record
in this case would indicate that Storer's last injury aggravated his prior disability and the act
5
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of the commission in assessing the award against
the plaintiffs was correct. (Record on Appeal,
p. 142).
What the Commission failed to perceive in so holding is the critical difference between the facts of the
Duaine Brown case and the fact of the instant case. In
Duaine Brown the defendant Storer was employed by
Duaine Brown Chevrolet Company, and while in the
course of his employment there he suffered a back injury on November 14, 1970. Prior to this time, he had
suffered a back injury on April 1, 1970, while employed
by Capitol Chevrolet Company, and had also suffered
similar injuries in 1965, 1966 and 1969. Storer filed for
Workmen's Compensation benefits following his last injury and the suit was heard by a hearing examiner after
a medical panel had filed a report regarding the injuries. The medical panel in its report apportioned
Storer's physical impairment among the various accidents, which would have had the effect of apportioning
liability between various employers (and, thus, among
their respective insurance carriers). However, the hearing examiner rejected the findings of the medical panel
regarding apportionment, holding such an action to be
improper. This was due to the fact that the chairman
of the medical panel testified at the hearing that the
medical panel was unable to attribute Storer's two herniated discs to any particular accident. In short, the panel
had been unable to attribute the injury to any particular
accident or accidents and as a result had apportioned
the injuries between several accidents. The Commission concurred in the findings of the Examiner and this
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Gourt affirmed, stating that Utah had no apportionment
statute allowing a recovery to be prorated among multiple insurers, "nor has the court attempted by decision
to make apportionments." Under the facts of that case,
the only decision that this court could reasonably have
made was to affirm the refusal of the commission to
apportion insurer's liability, since the medical panel had
been unable to determine which accident or accidents
caused the injury.
Although the instant case is very similar on its facts,
even to the type of injury involved, one critical difference
exists which makes this case a proper one for apportionment of the insurers' liability. Here the medical panel
was able to apportion the physical impairments between
three separate injuries, finding that a total 15% permanent disability existed with 5% of that disability
attributable to each of the three accidents. The panel
stated in its report, on page 3 :
[the panel] is of the opinion that, though it
may be somewhat arbitrary in nature, it would
best be considered a reasonable medical probability that each of these events contributed onethird to the need for surgery at this time.
The panel discussed each of the three injuries in
question, ruling specifically that each one contributed
separately toward the total disability. I n the Dumne
Brown case, the panel, finding itself unable to attribute
the disability to any particular injury, threw up its
hands in frustration and divided the liability in a totally
arbitrary fashion. Since the recommended apportion-
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ment there was totally without supporting findings or
evidence, the Commission in that case correctly ruled
that apportionment was improper.
The instant case presents a totally different situation, one where the panel clearly and unequivocally was
able to divide the total physical disability into three separate and distinct, but cumulative segments. Under this
set of facts, the only logical and reasonable course to
follow would be apportionment of the liability coinciding
with the apportionment of the disability.
POINT I I
T H I S COURT SHOULD ADOPT T H E R U L E
O F A P P O R T I O N M E N T UNDER T H E
F A C T S OF T H I S CASE.
Although Utah does not have a statute which apportions liability among insurance carriers, the concept
of apportionment is not foreign to the Workmen's Compensation Law of Utah. Section 35-1-69 provides that
if an employee becomes permanently incapacitated as
a result of an industrial injury while already suffering
from a pre-existing permanent incapacity, the liability
for the incapacity is apportioned according to a certain
formula, provided that the incapacity following the last
injury is "substantially greater" than the incapacity
which would have existed without the last injury. This
statute is commonly known as the second-injury fund
statute, and its effect is to alleviate the harshness of the
rule that the last insurer (i.e., employer) bears the bur-
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den for the entire incapacity in certain situations. The
statute reads in part as follows:
A medical panel having the qualifications of
the medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56,
shall review all medical aspects of the case and
determine first, the total permanent psysical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the
percentage of permanent physical impairment
attributable to the industrial injury; and fourth,
the percentage of permanent physical impairment
attributable to previously existing conditions
whether due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. The Industrial Commission shall
then assess the liability for compensation and
medical care to the employer on the basis of the
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury only and the
remainder shall be payable out of the said special
fund. Amounts, if any, which have been paid by
the employer in excess of the portion attributable
to the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed
to the employer out of said special fund. (Emphasis added).
Were it not for the fact that none of the injuries in
the instant case "substantially" increased the incapacity
of Mr. Taylor, 35-1-69 would be applicable, in which case
the liability would have been apportioned between the
last carrier and the special second-injury fund, into
which all participating employers pay.
It is not argued that 35-1-69 applies to the instant
situation, but it does set a statutory precedent for the
9
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concept of apportionment in the field of the law, and for
that reason should be considered.
Other than the Duaine Brown case, there appears
to be no case in this jurisdiction which definitely decides
whether or not apportionment of liability among Workmen's Compensaton insurance carriers should exist in
the absence of a statute, but many other courts have done
so.
As noted in the Commission's Findings, Conclusions
and Order, pages 2 and 3, Larson on Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 3, Section 95 reads as follows:
When a disability develops gradually, or
when it comes as a result of a succession of accidents, the insurance carrier covering that risk at
the time of the most recent injury or exposure
bearing any causal relation to the disability is
usually liable for the entire compensation. In
some jurisdictions, apportionment has been worked out by judicial decision, or provided for by
express statute, when events within the coverage
period of successive insurers contribute causally
to the final disability.
Mr. Larson further states that the above rule is
"tempered in some jurisdictions by a practice permitting
apportionment between two carriers when two successive
accidents combine to produce the final disability." The
leading case establishing this rule is Anderson v. Babcock
and Wilcox Company, 175 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1931), wherein
the injured employee fell while on the job on December
3, 1926, fracturing his hip. The fracture apparently
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healed following medical care, and Anderson went back
to work where, on August 8, 1927, while he was lifting a
heavy timber, the fragments in the hip parted at the
line of union, resulting in a disability.
The first accident occurred while Anderson was in
the employ of Carl Pierleoni, the second while he was
working for Babcock and Wilcox Company. An award
for the total disability was made against Babcock and
Wilcox Company and its insurance carrier, Travelers,
and from this award an appeal was taken.
The court stated:
Here it would seem that the evidence points
conclusively to two accidents; that the bones
merely parted does not appear. The healing and
union were partial as was apparent from the evidence as to the cracks felt in the hip at the same
place where the fracture had been... The lifting
of the heavy timber produced an accidental result.
. . . Obviously that result would not have happened had it not been for the first injury, but it was
immediately due to strain caused by heavy lifting.
(175 N.E. at p. 655).
The court continued:
On the evidence the present disability exists
by reason of the two accidents, and the compensation should be equally apportioned between the
two insurers. Unjust it is that the second insurer
should bear the entire liability when the second
accident is related in large measure to the first.
No less unjust it is that the first insurer should
bear the entire liability if it appears that without
II
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the second accident an earlier recovery might
have been had. In no event does the evidence
sustain an award against the second insurer alone.
(175 N.E. at p. 655).
The court then reversed and remanded the case to
the Industrial Board for a determination as to how the
liability should be apportioned.
Subsequent to the Babcoch decision, several cases
have adopted a rule of apportionment under circumstances similar to those of the instant case.
In Tri-State Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission,
379 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1963), the Colorado Industrial Commission awarded compensation to one Boyd Ezell, finding that he was 20% permanently but partially disabled
as a working unit as a result of three separate back injuries. The first injury occurred on May 7, 1958, while
working in Oklahoma, the second injury occurred on
June 15, 1958 while working for Sooner Contracting
Company in Colorado and the third injury occurred
September 22, 1958, while again working for Sooner.
The insurance carrier in June 1958 was Tri-State
while the carrier in September, 1958 was Standard
Casualty Company.
The Commission apportioned the liability for the
compensation due for the permanent disability equally
between the two carriers. Tri-State appealed, urging
that the apportionment was not proper under Colorado
law. The fact that Sooner Company was liable for the
12
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entire injury v/as not disputed nor was the finding of
20% disability.
, .,
.
In upholding the Commission's decision, the court
ruled that where two injuries occur during one employment, both of which contribute toward a permanent disability, and two carriers are involved, one with coverage
of the first injury and one with the coverage of the second, it is proper to apportion the award made for the
total disability between the two, even in the absence of
an apportionment statute. The court quoted from an
earlier opinion, stating the reason for its holding.
We think it is the policy of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to at all times hold the employer primarily liable to the employee for disability proximately resulting from accidents arising out of and in the course of the employment.
. . . It was not within the power of the employee
to require the employer to insure in one company,
nor was it within his power to prevent the employer from insuring with two companies; but it
was within the power of the employer and the two
insurance companies to provide as they might
deem advisable against just such contingency as
has here arisen. The Commission, as a fact-finding body, has exercised its best judgment in assessing the payment of this award against the two
companies equally. . . . (379 P.2d at p. 391).
In Haverlamd v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n.,
142 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1966), the court ruled that apportionment was proper in a workman's compensation
case where two or more injuries were causally connected
with a resulting disability.
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Haverland, the employee, while in the course of his
employment, injured himself on December 28,1960, while
working for Twin City's Milk Producers. Surgery was
required to repair a ruptured bicep muscle and he eventually returned to work where on October 13, 1961 he
sustained a herniated intervertebral disc while working.
Following hospitalization for this injury and subsequent
partial recovery, he again, returned to work. On November 21, 1961, while working for Tilleges Lumber Company in a part-time -capacity, he was again injured when
a truck backed over him and was subsequently hospitalized with serious injuries. He eventually returned to
work where, on August 18, 1962 (while working for Twin
Cities), he slipped and fell from a ladder, fracturing his
right leg. Again, he returned to work following recovery
and on the second day after returning he became ill and
was hospitalized with what was diagnosed as severe mental depression and conversion hysteria.
Following this series of events, he filed a claim for
permanent total disability due to his lack of capacity to
perform any work stemming from his mental disease.
He was awarded temporary total disability from August
18, 1962 to August of 1973 and temporary partial disability for some months after that. The referee held
that the insurer who covered the accident of August 18,
1962 was liable for this award under the provisions of
Minn. St. 1961, Section 176.13, which is similar to Section 35-1-69 IT.C.A. (1953). The Industrial Commission
upheld this award and Twin Cities appealed, arguing
that the award should be apportioned between it and
those who were liable for the injuries prior to August
18, 1962.

u
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The court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether or not the accidents prior to August 18,
1962 were causally connected with the disability, saying:
While we have not had occasion to pass directly
on this question, we have approved apportionment of liability for disability resulting from successive accidents under the same employer between two insurers, one of whom represented the
employer at the time of the first accident and the
other of whom represented him when the second
occurred {citations deleted).
It appears reasonable that if liability for compensation arising from two or more industrial accidents under the same employer may be apportioned between his successive insurers, it would
likewise be apportionable between successive employers where industrial accidents are sustained
under each of them, both of which contribute to
the disability of the employee. Such apportionment, of course, would be in the ratio that each
accident bears to the total disability involved, but
without limiting the primary responsibility of the
last employer as provided in Section 176.13. (142
N.W.2d at 280).
In Mund v. Farmers Cooperative, 94 A.2d 19? (Conn.
1952), a workman's compensation case, the court opted
for a rule of apportionment without a specific status
dictating that such should be the practice.
On July 29, 1946, the employee in question strained
his back while in the course of his employment and while
Ocean Accident & Guarantee, Ltd. was the insurance
carrier for his employer. As a result of this accident he
was disabled, but eventually returned to work following
W
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conservative treatment, suffering from a 15% permanent
disability. On June 29, 1950, he re-injured his back while
working for the same employer, but this time Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company was the carrier for his employer. This time surgery was performed and he eventually returned to work on October 16, 1950 still with a
permanent disability (although the court's opinion does
not specify the percentage of the disability after the
second injury). An appeal was taken after the commission directed that both insurers should bear the cost of
the disability and medical expenses following the second
injury, and the issue on appeal was framed by the court
as follows:
The appeal presents the question of whether
the [lower] court erred in sustaining the Commission's decision requiring both of the defendant
insurers as well as the defendant employer to pay
the award.
The court held, after discussion of the arguments
presented by the insurers (each urging that the other
should bear the full burden) that:
There is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions on the respective liability of successive
insurers, but the rulings of a substantial group
of courts support our conclusion that the commissioner's award against both insurers should be
sustained. . . . It is our conclusion that upon the
facts found in the present case common sense and
fairness support the rule adopted in New York,
Minnesota and Arkansas. The Commissioner's
conclusion holding both insurers equally liable
was properly sustained. (94 A.2d at p. 22).
16
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In Employer's Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company; 214 S.W.2d 774 (Arkansas 1948), an injured workman applied for compensation
following an industrial injury. The employee injured
his back while in the course of his employment on December 19, 1946, while pushing a wheelbarrow, but continued to work until February 14, 1947, although he was
in pain during this entire period. After visiting several
doctors, he was finally operated on for a herniated disc
in his lower back on April 16, 1947. The state's Industrial Commission found following its hearing that prior
to December 19, 1946, the employee suffered from a preexisting back weakness which made him susceptible to
injury, that he had aggravated this pre-existing condition on December 10, 1946, and that from December 19,
1946 to February 14, 1947, he had continued to receive
successive injuries to his back which progressively aggravated his condition until these events finally culminated in a disability. U.S. Fidelity, was the workman's compensation insurance carrier, on the employer in question
prior to February 1, 1947, at which time, Employer's
Casualty took over. The issue on appeal was framed
by the court as follows:
The question for our determination is the
respective liabilities of these two insurance carriers to pay the award, it being appellant's contention that the full liability should fall upon appellee, and appellee on cross-appeal argues that
the full liability should fall upon appellant. (214
S.W.2dat p. 774).
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The court held as follows:
In the circumstances here, while this court as
above noted appears not to have specifically
passed upon the question dividing liability, and
while we think the evidence, when liberally construed, was sufficient to have fastened liability
on either of these insurance carriers for the full
amount, we are unable to say that an equal division of this liability, for a single disability, on the
facts presented, was not within the Commission's
power and we hold that the action of the trial
court in affirming the Commission's order is supported by reason and authority. (214 S.W.2d at
p. 777).
Also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 445 P.2d 846 (Ariz. 1968) and Quinm v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 142 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1958).
The common thread which runs through all of these
cases is the fact that a compensable disability is causally
connected with two or more injuries and it is possible to
attach a percentage of the disability to each injury. This
is exactly the situation in the instant case. Even though
the Workmen's Compensation law of Utah is statutory
rather than common law, this court still has the power
to interpret and expand statutory law when the situation requires it. The facts of the instant case present a
more compelling case for apportionment than any of the
fact situations in the cases cited above, and the most
sound and logical course to follow would be to apply the
rule of apportionment in this case.

18
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs do not seek a blanket holding that
apportionment should apply in all situations where two
insurance carriers have coverage over a succession of
injuries, nor do they even contend that apportionment
is proper in all cases where two or more injuries result
in a disability. All plaintiffs seek from this court is a
ruling that under the facts of this particular case, where
the medical panel is able to and clearly does, upon sufficient evidence, divide the responsibility for a disability
among two or more successive injuries, and where each
of these injuries is found by the panel to be a partial
cause of the total disability, and where a causal connection is found between each injury and the final disability,
the liability for that disability (including the medical
expenses incurred as a result) should be apportioned
among successive insurance carriers and/or employers,
should they exist.
Respectfully

submitted,

Robert W. Brandt
Jon J. Bunderson
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON
& CHRISTOPHERSON
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mountain States Steel Company
and Argonaut Insurance Company
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